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Commonwealth v. Segida
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE - The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the
Commonwealth does not have to prove that a defendant did not imbibe alcohol after driving in
order to charge with DUI under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802.
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THE SEGIDA DECISION

At about 12:20 a.m. on September 19, 2004, Officer Hillyard ("Hillyard") arrived at the
scene of a one-car accident.I Hillyard found two brothers standing near a car that was at the top
of a hillside and rotated 180 degrees from the direction of the road.2 One of the brothers, Paul A.
Segida ("Segida"), disclosed to Hillyard that he owned the vehicle, was driving and lost control
while arguing with his brother. 3 Hillyard detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from Segida
and proceeded to question Segida, who then confessed to consuming alcohol at a local
establishment prior to driving home that night.4 Following Segida's poor performance on three
field sobriety tests, Hillyard determined Segida was unable to drive safely, arrested him and took
him to the hospital to have his blood alcohol level ("BAL") tested.s The test results revealed a
BAL of .326 percent, more than four times the legal limit.6
The Commonwealth charged Segida with two counts of Driving Under the Influence
(DUI) under 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3802(a)(1) 7 and 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3802(c)8 and a bench
trial was held on October 20, 2005.9 The Honorable Judge Cheryl Allen found Segida guilty of
both charges based on the testimony of the only witness, Hillyard.10 Judge Allen sentenced
Segida to 180 days of intermediate punishment on electronic monitoring and three years
.
2

4

Commonwealth v. Segida, 985 A.2d 871, 873 (Pa. 2009).
Segida, 985 A.2d at 873.
Id.

Id.

Segida, 985 A.2d at 873.
Id. Under 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3802 (2009), the legal limit for blood alcohol level is .08%.
7
(a)(1) GENERAL IMPAIRMENT - An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical
control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is
rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
.*
(c) HIGHEST RATE OF ALCOHOL- An individual may not drive, operate or be
in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the
alcohol concentration in the individual's blood or breath is 0.16% or higher within two hours after the individual has
driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
9.*
Segida, 985 A.2d at 873. Segida was also charged with summary careless driving under 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 3714 (2009). His conviction on that charge was not at issue on appeal. Id. at 874.
.

6

10.

Id.
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probation.
Segida appealed his conviction to the Superior Court, arguing that the Commonwealth
did not produce sufficient evidence to prove when he consumed alcohol or drove, nor did it put
forth enough information to determine the time of the accident.12 The Superior Court reversed
the conviction under § 3802(a)(1) based on the Commonwealth's failure to establish when
Segida was driving, thus failing to meet its burden that he was incapable of driving safely when
operating the car. 13 The Commonwealth admitted it could not prove the time that the blood was
taken, and therefore, failed to meet its burden under § 3802(c). 14 The majority found that the
Commonwealth also failed to rule out the possibility that Segida drank the alcohol after the
accident.' 5 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania then granted the Commonwealth's petition for
- -16
certiorari.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was faced with two legal issues regarding
interpretation of § 3820(a)(1): (1) whether the statute was a "while driving statute"1 7 and (2)
what elements the Commonwealth needed to prove in order to obtain a conviction. 18 A majority
of the court held that § 3802(a)(1) is an "at the time of driving" crime and the Commonwealth
must prove that the defendant was driving, operating, or in actual control of the movement of the
automobile during the time he or she was incapable of safely operating an automobile due to
impairment. 19
The interpretation of § 3802(a)(1) was a question of first impression.20 The Segida
majority began with reviewing principles of statutory construction starting with the plain
meaning of the language, consideration of the title, consideration of the mischief remedied by the
statute, and the General Assembly's intent as expressed in § 3802.21 The Supreme Court also
compared the language of the repealed § 3731 with the newly enacted § 3802.22
The court looked at Commonwealth v. Duda23 for a starting point in analyzing the
statute.24 In Duda, the court upheld § 3802(a)(1) in the face of a constitutional challenge and, in
doing so, noted that the statute prohibits driving while impaired.2 5
The Supreme Court then turned to previous Superior Court cases addressing §
11.

Id. at 873-74.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Segida, 912 A.2d 841, 844 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006)).
3
Id. at 850.
14
Id. at 845.
5
Id. at 848-49.
6
Segida, 985 A.2d at 874.
17
Id. at 875. "While driving" refers to the fact that the Commonwealth would have to prove the
blood alcohol level of the motorist at the time he or she was operating the vehicle. Id.
18
Id. at 879.
19.
Id."At the time of driving" means that a trial court is focusing on the driver's inability to drive
safely due to ingesting alcohol, instead of a particular blood alcohol level. Id
20
Id. at 876.
21
Segida, 985 A.2d at 874-75. (citing Commonwealth v. Hoke, 962 A.2d 664, 666 (Pa. 2009);
Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66, 74 (Pa. 2008); Commonwealth v. Bavusa, 832 A.2d 1042, 1050 (Pa.
2003)).
22
Id. at 875.
23.
923 A.2d 1138 (Pa. 2007) (stating that "it is now unlawful, not only to drive while under the
influence . . . but also to ingest a substantial amount of alcohol and then operate a motor vehicle before the alcohol
is dissipated to below a defined threshold (here, .08%) ... at the actual moment of driving.") The Court recognized
that, though dicta, Duda was still instructive. Segida, 985 A.2d at 876.
24
Id. at 875-76.
25
Id. at 876.
12
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3802(a)(1), specifically in the context of applying the statute as an "at the time of driving"
owatv.
27
crime. 26 In Cm
Commonwealth
v. Kerry , the Superior Court found that under § 3802(a)(1), the
Commonwealth may prove in any sufficient manner it deems necessary that the accused was
operating a vehicle after drinking enough alcohol to render him incapable of driving safely. 28
The Segida court also looked at Commonwealth v. Williams 29 where sufficient evidence was
found that the defendant was in control of the automobile while incapable of safely driving. 30
While not directly addressing the issue presented by Segida, the Supreme Court stated that both
cases supported an application of an "at the time of driving" offense theory, despite the
Commonwealth's argument that the time of driving by the accused is irrelevant to § 3802(a)(1). 3 1
The Supreme Court noted that the Superior Court also applied this precedent to reach its ruling. 32
The Supreme Court then moved to the language of the statute itself and contrasted §
3802(a)(1) to § 3802(a)(2), (b), and (c).33 The Segida majority stated that in light of the obvious
time requirements in the other subsections, declining to imply a time requirement in subsection
(a)(1) would be irrational.34 When considering factors such as the plain meaning of the statute
and the goals desired, the court found that it is rational and sensible that operating a vehicle is
prohibited only during the time after consumption in which one cannot safely drive. 3 5
The Segida majority then turned to the elements necessary to prove guilt under §
3802(a)(1) and the types of evidence that may be used in the prosecution.36 BAL may be used in
a § 3802(a)(1) case to prove the defendant's inability to drive safely, however, the two hour time
limit specified in § 3802 (a)(2), (b), and (c) do not apply. 37 The court also stated that the
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant was driving or in actual physical control of the
automobile while he or she was unable to operate the automobile safely because of consuming
alcohol.38
The Supreme Court flatly declined to require the prosecution to prove that the defendant
did not consume any alcohol after an accident. 39 The court relied on the language of the statute
and stated that there is no foundation to require proof that the defendant consumed no alcohol
after an accident. 4 0
The court concluded by analyzing the sufficiency of evidence of the case. 41 In light of
26

Id.

906 A.2d 1237 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
Segida, 985 A.2d at 876-77.
941 A.2d 14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
Segida, 941 A.2d at 877. Williams appealed on the grounds that the police could not prove she
had become inebriated or had operated her vehicle in an inebriated state after finding her in the back seat of her car
while it was still running and stopped across railroad tracks. Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2008).
27

28
29
30.

31
32

Id. at 877-78.

38

Id.

39.

Id. at 880 n. 6.
Segida, supra, at 880.
Id. at 880-81.

912 A.2d 841 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); Segida, 985 A.2d at 878.
.
Id.
.
Id.
35
Segida, 985 A.2d at 878-79.
3.
36.
Id. at 879 (listing the offender's actions and behavior, including performance on sobriety tests,
manner of driving, attitude toward the officer, appearance, speech patterns, and odor of alcohol as methods that can
be used in proving guilt).
37
Id.

40
41
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Segida's admissions, the position of the car, the failed field sobriety tests, the officer's
professional opinion, and the defendant's high BAL, the court concluded that the evidence was
sufficient to support a conviction and vacated the Superior Court order. 42
Madame Justice Greenspan wrote a concurring opinion. 43 Unlike the majority, Justice
Greenspan interpreted § 3802(a)(1) as disallowing driving after drinking alcohol in an amount
leaving the driver unable to safely drive a vehicle. Using the same principles of statutory
construction, 44 she pointed to the clear use of the word "after" in the statute, which she believed
demonstrated the legislature's intent to prohibit driving within a "reasonable time after" drinking
enough alcohol to impair an individual's ability to safely operate a vehicle. 45 Justice Greenspan
noted the legislative intent to eliminate the need for expert opinions on BAL as evidenced by the
change in the statutory language, and if the legislature had meant to simply punish driving while
intoxicated, the language would have remained the same. 46 In her view, the change in the
language of the statute confirms the intent to punish those who operate a vehicle after drinking. 47
Justice Greenspan's interpretation would require the Commonwealth to show that (1) the
defendant drank an amount of alcohol, which made the him unable to drive safely and (2) that
the defendant was driving an automobile within a reasonable amount of time after ingesting
alcohol.48 She joined the majority in declining to require proof by the prosecution that the
defendant did not drink after the accident. 49
Justice Eakin also wrote a concurring opinion.5 0 He relied on the rules of statutory
construction much like the majority and Justice Greenspan, but reached a different conclusion
about § 3802(a)(1). 5 1 He found that the word "after" is ambiguous, compelling the court to look
to various sources for definition of the word in order to accurately interpret the statute. 52 Justice
Eakin concluded that "after" in this context clearly means "next," and therefore, the operation of
the vehicle must be "temporally proximate" to drinking alcohol to the level of legal
impairment.53
Justice Eakin stated that the statute only requires proof of operating a vehicle after
consuming alcohol, thus eliminating the requirement for proof of intoxication at the time of
driving and expert testimony. 54 He took the facts of the case, contrasted the old statutory
requirements against the new statute, highlighted the legislature's intent to eliminate the need for
expert testimony, and allowed common sense to play a role in cases under §3802(a)(1). 5 5 Justice
Eakin would require the prosecution to prove that consuming alcohol occurred before driving
and that the consumption caused the inability to drive safely, thus eliminating the need to prove
Id. at 880-81.

42
43

44

Id. at 88 1.

Id. at 882-83 (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 192(b).).
Segida, 985 A.2d at 883.
46.
Id. at 883 (citing COMMONWEALTH OF PA. LEGIS. J. Commonwealth v. MacPherson, 752 A.2d 384, 387 n. 3 (Pa. 2000)).
47.
Id. at 883-84.
48
Id. at 884.
44.
45

49

HOUSE,

Sept. 29, 2003, at 1889;

Id.

Segida, 985 A.2d at 884.

50

51

Id.
Id. at 884-85 (citing WEBSTER'S

52

NEW UNIVERSAL ABRIDGED DICTIONARY 34

(2d. deluxe ed.

1983)).
54

.

Id. at 885.

Id.
.5
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the exact time of driving. 56
II.

THE HISTORY BEHIND THE SEGIDA DECISION

Pennsylvania's current DUI statute was enacted on September 30, 2003 and became
effective on February 1, 2004." Throughout its period of enactment, former DUI statute 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 3731ss survived various attacks on its constitutionality but was still subject to
other suits and challenges. 59 The legislature made several failed attempts to modify the former
DUI statute in order to eliminate the need for expert testimony. 60 The new statute was intended
to be an improvement on the previous statute by clarifying the law and lessening the importance
of expert testimony on blood alcohol levels and tests. 61
Evidentiary issues with 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3731 were addressed in Commonwealth v.
Kelley,62 where the Superior Court addressed the elements that the Commonwealth needed to
prove in a § 3731 (a)(1) case.63 The majority stated that the Commonwealth had to prove that the
defendant was (1) driving the vehicle and (2) doing so while under the influence of alcohol to a
point that left him unable to drive safely. 64 Proof that the defendant had not ingested alcohol
after driving was mentioned as another element although it was not explicitly labeled a necessary
requirement.65 The court then reversed Kelley's conviction and sentencing under § 3731(a)(1)
due to the Commonwealth's failure to prove the time of the accident and whether the defendant
consumed alcohol before or after the accident. 66
Commonwealth v. Loeper67 highlighted the difficulties with evidence when proving a
prima facie case for any subsection of § 3731 other than (a)(1).68 In Loeper, the defendant was
56

Id.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3802.
.8
75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3731.
defined.--A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the
Offense
(a)
movement of a vehicle in any of the following circumstances: (1) While under the influence of
alcohol to a degree which renders the person incapable of safe driving; (2) While under the
influence of any controlled substance, as defined in the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64),
known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, to a degree which renders
the person incapable of safe driving; (3) While under the combined influence of alcohol and any
controlled substance to a degree which renders the person incapable of safe driving; (4) While the
amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of: (i) an adult is 0.10~ or greater; or (ii) a minor is 0.02~
or greater.
59.
See Commonwealth v. Rishel, 658 A.2d 352 (Pa. Super. Ct 1995) (upholding § 373 1(a)(5) against
a constitutionality challenge); Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 470 A.2d 1339 (Pa. 1983) (upholding the validity of
3731(a)(4)); Commonwealth v. Feathers, 660 A.2d 90 (Pa. 1995) (upholding the permissibility of reviewing a
judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of evidence to uphold jury conviction).
60.
See Commonwealth v. Barud, 681 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1996) (holding § 373 1(a)(5) was
constitutionally infirm).
61
See Commonwealth v. Duda, 923 A.2d 1138, 1147 (Pa. 2007). See also Commonwealth v.
McCoy, 895 A.2d 18, 28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
62
652 A.2d 378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
.
652 A.2d at 378. Kelley was charged under §3731(a)(1) after he was found unconscious in his car
and smelling of alcohol. Id. at 382-83. He was found to have a blood Alcohol level of .18% one hour and forty
minutes after the accident but no evidence he was intoxicated at the time he was driving. Id.
64
Id. at 382.
58

65
66

67
68

Id. at 382-83.
Id. at 383.

663 A.2d 669 (Pa. 1995).
Id. at 674.
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charged under § 3731 (a)(4) for the operation of a motor vehicle while having a BAL of 0.10% or
greater. 69 The Commonwealth attempted to use evidence from the arresting police officers about
Loeper's physical signs of impairment, such as slurred speech and bloodshot eyes.70
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that § 3731 (a)(4), as written, was limited to direct
evidence as relevant to the defendant's BAL.n The majority held that any evidence of physical
impairment when a defendant is not charged under § 3731(a)(1) is prejudicial and irrelevant. 72
The Loeper court stated that expert testimony on BAL would be appropriate evidence for the
Commonwealth as well as proper cross-examination of any expert witnesses presented by the
defendant. 73
Changes to § 3731 by the legislature also produced various constitutional challenges
under the due process clause of the United States Constitution as in Commonwealth v.
MacPherson.74 Pennsylvania added subsection (a. 1)75 to § 3731 in order to create an evidentiary
instrument that allows the fact finder to utilize a permissive inference of a prima facie case
through the BAL obtained from the defendant. 76 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court looked to
previous cases where the defendants' respective BALs were significantly above the legal limit to
approve usage of the permissive inference.7 7
The MacPherson court also corrected other errors by the lower courts in considering the
constitutionality of the statute. 78 The majority stated that the lower courts' approach was
incorrect, as it stated that (a. 1) creates a rebuttal presumption and the courts and never clarified
the term or the legal operation or affect of the subsection. 79 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of § 3731 (a. 1) and stated that the permissive inference created by the
statute could be properly rebutted through competent evidence presented by the defendant.8 0
However, Commonwealth v. McCoy-one of the first cases after the enactment of the
new statute, 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3802-was an appeal of a DUI conviction where the officer
had charged the defendant under the old and rescinded statute, § 3731.81 The defendant
challenged his arrest and conviction due to the arresting officer's failure to cite the proper statute
69

Id. at 670.

70

72

Id. at 673.
Id.
Loeper, 663 A.2d at 674.

7.

Id.

71

752 A.2d 384, 386 (Pa. 2000).
.
Section 3731(a)(1) states:
Prima facie evidence. - (1) It is prima facie evidence that: (i) an adult had 0.10% or more by
weight of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving, operating or being in actual physical
control of the movement of any vehicle if the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of the
person is equal to or greater than 0.10% at the time a chemical test is performed on a sample of the
person's breath, blood or urine; (2) For the purposes of this section, the chemical test of the
sample of the person's breath, blood or urine shall be from a sample obtained within three hours
after the person drove, operated or was in actual physical control of the vehicle.
74.

75 PA. CONS. STAT. §3731(a)(1).
76

MacPherson,752 A.2d at 392.

Id. at 389. (citing Commonwealth v. Jarman, 601 A.2d 1229 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v.
Modaffare, 601 A.2d 1233 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v. Yarger, 648 A.2d 529 (Pa. 1994)).
7.

78

Id. at 393.

Id. See also Commonwealth v. Lippert, 887 A.2d 1277 (Pa. Super. Ct.2005) (holding that a
defendant with a BAC of.10% one hour after driving was insufficient proof of guilt for a conviction).
79.
so

Id. at 392-93.

81

895 A.2d 18, 23 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
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at the time of arrest.82 The Superior Court stated that the initial use of the wrong statute was
inconsequential because the same conduct was criminalized in both statutes, the arrest was
proper, and the Commonwealth could proceed from that point with the proper statute. 83
The defendant next challenged his convictions by stating that convictions under two
separate subsections84 violated his constitutional protections against double jeopardy.ss The
majority stated that double jeopardy protections are violated when a defendant receives multiple
sentences under subsections of the same statute designed to punish one harm. 86 However, in
McCoy, the defendant was only given one merged sentence under his convictions for separate
subsections, which did not violate the double jeopardy protection.8 7
The accused then challenged § 3802 in its entirety as unconstitutional because it is
"vague and overbroad and allows for arbitrary enforcement in violation of due process."" The
Superior Court noted that it is quite obvious from the statute's language that the legislature
created it with the clear intention of preventing people from driving while under the influence of
alcohol. 89 The language of the statute gives a "person of ordinary intelligence" sufficient notice
of the behavior expected of the individual.90
The court also upheld the ten-year look back 9 1 element of the statute, stating that the
legislature has an interest in preventing repetitive offenders of statutes designed to prevent a
serious harm to the public. 92 Lastly, the majority quickly dismissed appellant's equal protection
challenge, stating that the legislature has an interest in treating offenders with different levels of
alcohol in their respective systems differently due to the danger posed to the general public. 93
The time nexus elements of the statute, different treatment of individual with varying degrees of
BALs, and the punishments regardless of presence of BAL test results were all upheld within the
opinion.9 4
In Commonwealth v. Thur, the Superior Court once again addressed a constitutional
challenge to the new DUI statute, along with various other issues raised on appeal. 95 The
defendant was charged with driving under the influence under §§ 3802(a)(1), (c) and homicide
by vehicle. 96 Thur challenged the constitutionality of both subsections of §3802 under which he
was charged, arguing that they were vague and overbroad. 97 Citing McCoy, the court upheld the
McCoy, 895 A.2d at 24. (Appellant argued that arresting officer citing defendant under old § 3731

82.

after the enactment of§ 3802 was improper and the case should be dismissed.)
.
Id. at 25.
84.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3802(a)(1) and (c).
86
McCoy, 895 A.2d at 25.
.
Id. at 26 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 871 A.2d 254 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)).
8
Id.
88
Id. at 29.
89
Id. at 30-31.
9o
McCoy, 895 A.2d at 31.
91.
When prosecuting DUI cases, the Commonwealth will look back into the offender's criminal
record for the designated amount of years, previously 7 and now 10 years, to see if there are any prior DUI
convictions. If prior convictions exist, the punishment for the offender for the new conviction will be increased. Id.
at 33.
92
Id. at 33-34.
93.
94.
95.
96

.

Id. at 39.
Id. at 39-42.
906 A.2d 552, 557 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
Thur, 906 A.2d 557.
Id.
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subsections against both challenges. 98 The statute also survived a due process violation claim. 99
In Thur, the defendant also challenged the jury instruction given by the trial court and the
inferences it allowed the jury to make as to BAL at the time he was driving. 00 On appeal, the
majority stated that the jury is allowed to consider the BAL obtained through testing as well as
testimony about the accused's physical signs of intoxication in evaluating his ability to drive at
the time he was driving.101 The jury instruction given by the trial court was appropriate and
properly instructed the jurors to consider the weight of the BAL test and the changes the BAL
undergoes over time in relation to the defendant's ability to drive safely. 102
The Superior Court also addressed the specific elements that the Commonwealth must
prove in order to obtain a conviction under § 3802 in Commonwealth v. Kerry.103 In Kerry, the
defendant was charged under § 3802(a)(1) for driving an all-terrain vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol.104 On appeal, Kerry raised two issues, the right to a jury trial under §
3802(a)(1) and the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth.105
The Kerry court looked to the guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme Court to
determine whether defendants would be entitled to a jury trial under § 3802(a)(1).106 Any crime
with a sentence of more than six months is considered a serious crime and therefore warrants the
guarantee of a jury trial.107 Because the punishment for a first time offender under § 3802(a)(1)
is less than six months, the court held that the defendant's right to a jury trial was not violated.os
With regard to the sufficiency of evidence, the Kerry court established that the
Commonwealth must prove two elements in a DUI case: (1) the accused was driving a vehicle
(2) after ingesting an amount of alcohol that rendered him or her unable to drive safely.109 The
court held that Commonwealth is allowed to prove these elements in any fair manner. 110 The
majority upheld the conviction based on the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the time of
trial.'
In Commonwealth v. Duda, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed the
constitutionality of 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3802.112 The majority stated that § 3802 could not be
98

Id. at 562-64.

99.

Id. at 566.

1oo

Id. at 567. The jury instruction stated:
Consider the defendant's blood alcohol along with the other evidence relevant to his condition
when you decide whether the defendant was incapable of safe driving. If there was a delay
between the time the defendant was driving, operating or in control and the time when the sample
was taken, then ask yourselves, did the defendant's blood alcohol level change in the interval?
Thur, 906 A.2d at 567. Thur maintained that this charge allowed the jury to impermissibly guess his BAL when he
was driving in addition to whether he was incapable of driving at that time. Id.
101
Thur, 906 A.2d at 567.
102
Id. at 567-68.
104
906 A.2d 1237, 1241 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
104.
Kerry, 906 A.2d at 1238.
105
Id. at 1238-39.
106
Id. at 1239.
107
Kerry, 906 A.2d at 1239 (citing Commonwealth v. Mayberry, 327 A.2d 86, 89 (Pa. 1974); Blanton
v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1974); Commonwealth v. Hargraves, 883 A.2d 616, 620 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
08
Kerry, 906 A.2d at 1239-40.
109
Id. at 1241.
1io.
Id. (citing Loeper, 663 A.2d at 673-74).
TII. Id. (stating that the testimony of the arresting officer of seeing the defendant on the ATV, his
bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and refusal to submit to a breath test was sufficient).
112.
923 A.2d 1138, 1139 (Pa. 2007).

https://ddc.duq.edu/dclj/vol1/iss1/10

8

Lachat: 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Sec. 3802 (a)(1) is a While Driving Offense: C

Hummel v. Rosemeyer

Fall 2010

20

ruled invalid under the reasoning used in Commonwealth v. Barud13 because it was a wholly
new statute and not simply a modification of § 3731.114 The court stated that the new statute
represented a complete rewriting of the DUI statute and restructured the proof required by the
Commonwealth." 5 The court also upheld the statute in the face of vagueness and overbreadth
challenges.116
In Duda, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that under § 3802, the amount of blood
absorbed in the bloodstream at the time of driving became less important and shifted the focus to
the test BAL as long as the test was administered within the two hours as prescribed by the
statute. 117 The majority described the two elements necessary for conviction: (1) the individual
operated a vehicle after drinking and (2) did so after drinking an amount of alcohol which
brought the individual's BAL between .08% and .10%."
In Commonwealth v. Williams, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania upheld a conviction
under § 3802(a)(1) as an offense of driving while the defendant was unable to drive safely due to
consumption of alcohol prior to driving.119 The defendant was found in the backseat of her car
by a police officer, and the car was found stuck on railroad tracks with the keys in the ignition
and engine running.120 Williams filed an omnibus motion for pre-trial relief stating that the
police lacked probably cause to arrest her for a DUI charge.121 The court upheld the arrest,
holding that given the facts of the case, probable cause existed to arrest the defendant for a
DUI.1 22
III.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE SEGIDA DECISION

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Segida was not surprising. The court
historically defers to the legislature,123 especially in areas of major societal importance such as
preventing deaths or injuries due to drunk driving. DUI issues are complicated, and statutes have
to be crafted carefully in order to ensure that the law does not impinge upon the rights of the
individual. A court has to look to the construction and application of the statute in order to
assess its validity. Additionally, it must determine the necessary factors that the Commonwealth
must prove in order to meet its burden to obtain a conviction. The Segida court made a
necessary decision in upholding § 3802, and was also correct in not requiring the
Commonwealth to prove that the accused did not consume alcohol after an accident involving
drunk driving.
In the cases leading up to Segida, the appellate courts continually upheld the

Barud,681 A.2d 162.
Duda, 923 A.2d at 1147 (reasoning that the redrafting of the statute showed an intent to red-define
the offense and not simply add an alternative means of prosecuting under the existing DUI statute).
115
Id.
116
Id. at 1147-52.
117
Duda, 923 A.2d at 1147.
114
114.

118

Id.

941 A.2d 14, 29 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
Williams, 941 A.2d at 19.
121
Id.
122
122.
Id. at 27 (citing Commonwealth v. Woodruff, 668 A.2d 1158, 1161 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (finding
that a running motor, location of the vehicle, and other additional evidence is sufficient in determining physical
control of the vehicle).
123.
Segida, 985 A.2d at 874-75 (citing Commonwealth v. Hoke, 962 A.2d 664, 666 (Pa. 2009)).
119

120.
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constitutionality of Pennsylvania's DUI statutes.124 Drunk driving is quite obviously the kind of
harm that the legislature attempts to prevent by any means necessary. However, the wording
required to construct the necessary statute has proved quite difficult throughout the development
of DUI law. The original statute, § 3731, allowed many defendants to request a jury trial and
then escape conviction by calling expert witnesses to exploit small gaps in the wording of the
statute. This statute required the Commonwealth to prove the BAL of the defendant while
driving. The police often had a difficult time obtaining a blood sample within the required time
following an accident or a traffic stop. When a blood sample and a BAL were finally obtained,
the Commonwealth would then have to take steps to prove to either the trial court or a jury that
the defendant's BAL was above the legal limit when he or she was driving. The use of expert
witnesses became overwhelming on the system and required the Commonwealth to counter
complaints of excessive use of experts, thereby spending taxpayer money.
The legislature attempted to remedy this problem by enacting § 3802 to replace § 3731.
The new statute was crafted to eliminate the need for expert testimony and lessen the burden on
the Commonwealth for proving a DUI offense while setting clearer evidentiary guidelines for the
offense. Yet, inevitably, the words of the statute fell short of perfect. The Supreme Court once
again upheld the constitutionality of § 3802 in Segida but also clarified that § 3802(a)(1) is an at
the time of driving offense. 125 The majority states that the focus of the subsection was to charge
the defendant with driving while he or she was unable to do so safely due to the consumption of
alcohol. The court stated that the statute's construction removes the burden of proving a specific
BAL at the time of driving.126 By making these statements, the court verified the validity of the
new DUI statute and allowed the Commonwealth to continue to prosecute DUI offenders under
the statute. The court had to uphold the statute because invalidating a DUI law would create a
hole in the law that would allow drunk drivers to harm other individuals with no punishment or
repercussions. The court acknowledges that while the statute is not perfect, the legislative intent
is clear and the evidentiary requirements are constitutional.
The Segida court then went further and directly outlined the elements the Commonwealth
must prove to obtain a conviction under § 3802(a)(1).127 By doing so, the court simplified the
requirements of the statute and the steps necessary for the Commonwealth to obtain a conviction.
In Footnote 6 of the Segida case, the court finally bluntly states that the Commonwealth does not
need to prove that the defendant did not ingest alcohol after an accident. 128 The new statute
contains no language that would even hint at the need for evidence proving this factor. By so
holding, the court addressed the issues in Kelly. The court decreased the risk that the defendant
would be acquitted simply because the Commonwealth was unable to prove that the defendant
had not consumed alcohol after his accident.
By formally eliminating the element, the court lessened the challenges faced by the
Commonwealth and allowed the Commonwealth to accomplish the legislature's intent. Segida
was a necessary statement the court. More importantly, the decision allows the state to prevent
harm and destruction caused by drunk driving. If the court had continued to require the
Commonwealth to prove that the defendant did not drink post-accident, many defendants would
either receive an acquittal or dismissal, despite the presence of overwhelming evidence. The
124
125.
126
127
128
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75 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3731; 3802.
Segida, 985 A.2d at 879.
Id.
Id. at 878-79.
Id. at 880, n.6.
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court found that this was never a requirement under § 3802 because it would have been rendered
as full of flaws and shortcomings as its predecessor, § 3731. Additionally, a plain reading of the
statute does not require such evidence. Further, if the court would have invalidated the new
statute, the legislature would have been left to return to the drawing board to create a new DUI
statute that likely would have been as flawed as its predecessors.
The Segida decision was a necessary and logical one. The court validated the
legislature's attempt to improve DUI law and reduce taxpayer spending. In addition, the court
interpreted the new statute as reducing the Commonwealth's burden of proof in DUI cases and
confirmed the Commonwealth's responsibility and ability to prevent unnecessary harm by
dangerous individuals who carelessly consume alcohol and then operate a vehicle at the risk of
killing or injuring others.
Allison Lachat
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